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Abstract 
Salary compression has been an issue in higher education for almost four decades, during which 
a diverse literature on the topic has accumulated. Perhaps because of the absence of a 
compilation and review of this literature, administrations and collective bargaining agents 
commonly develop their own methods for identifying and rectifying salary compression on each 
campus. Most responses are short-term and do not prevent the problem from recurring. We 
review the literature concerning salary compression in higher education, then summarize our 
approach to correcting salary structure and preventing future compression.  
 
Literature Review 
The Problem 
Becker’s (1975) theory of specific human capital suggests that experience provides workers with 
knowledge and skills that are valuable to employers, and so workers with greater seniority are 
worth more. Furthermore, current effort and performance may be encouraged by the promise of 
higher wages in the future Lazear (1981). There are a variety of economic models that draw 
similar conclusions, such that it is widely accepted that wages should rise with seniority (Topel, 
1991). Some have suggested that this is not true for university faculty because faculty are 
attracted by non-monetary forms of compensation, leading to meager pay increases with 
seniority and resistance to pay differentials based on productivity or discipline (Bowen and 
Schuster, 1986; p 248-9; Hearn, 1999; Clark, 1987). 
However, a considerable positive correlation between seniority and pay among university faculty 
in most fields is generally well established (Barbezat, 2003). Work from the, 1970’s found 
professional experience to be the most powerful factor in predicting salaries (Braskamp et al., 
1978; Hamovitch and Morgenstern, 1975). Across the 1980s, pay for Professors was about two-
thirds higher than that of Assistant Professors (Bowen and Schuster, 1986; Scott and Bereman, 
1992) and salary ratios across the ranks remained steady through the mid-1990s (Hearn, 1999). 
Given the average years on the job between these ranks, such pay increases as a result of 
seniority in academia are probably similar to those of United States workers in general, where 
ten years of seniority is worth about 25 percent in additional pay (Topel, 1991).  
Variation in faculty salaries may also result from disciplinary differences, and these began to 
grow in the 1980s as a result of an imbalance of supply and demand for faculty in certain fields. 
As salaries rose in high demand areas, budgets were balanced by reducing salaries for low 
demand areas. Thus, while the differences between average salaries at junior and senior ranks 
were constant from 1971 to 1987, the coefficient of variation increased (Hammermesh, 1988). 
High paid fields became higher and low paid fields became lower. Scott and Bereman (1992) 
found a similar pattern at land grant institutions; much larger salary increases in business, 
computer science, and engineering than in education, fine arts, foreign languages and letters. 
This pattern continued into the 1990s, with business, law, medicine, and engineering faculty 
rising faster than those in education, liberal arts, languages and literatures (Hearn, 1999). The 
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factors that influenced average faculty salaries across disciplines also affected salaries within 
disciplines.  
Competition for faculty in certain fields can result in relatively high salaries for new hires. 
Funding for new faculty salaries may be obtained by restraining inflationary and promotion 
increases for current faculty. This reduces the effect of seniority on salary, resulting in a situation 
termed “salary compression” (e.g., Kassem, 1971). In extreme cases, the salaries of those with 
less seniority is greater than those with more, resulting in a pattern that has been termed “salary 
inversion” (Jennings and McLaughlin, 1997). We will refer to both patterns generically as 
“salary compression.”  The first peer-reviewed journal article to examine this pattern in academia 
was Gomez-Mejia and Balkin in 1987, although it was apparently already widely recognized and 
discussed. They state that “One can scarcely attend a professional meeting where this topic does 
not come up.” Blum (1989) suggested that salary compression became an issue in academia only 
in the 1980s. Many institutions have worked to identify and rectify salary compression and this 
has produced an extensive literature on the topic. Regardless, it continues to be an issue 
(McDonald and Sorenson, 2017; Rees, 2017).  
Does salary compression exist in academia? The answer is dependent on many factors and 
various studies have produced sometimes conflicting results. Some researchers have found an 
absence of salary compression (Barbezat and Donihue, 1998; Barbezat, 2004a, 2004b; 
Toutkoushian, 1998; Seaman, 2005, 2007a; Yeh and Wang, 2012). There may be significant 
variation across disciplines and time (Bereman and Lengnick-Hall, 1994; McDonald and 
Sorenson, 2017; Seaman, 2007b). Compression seems to be most prominent in a few rapidly 
growing fields, especially business (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1987; Hammermesh, 1988; Scott 
and Bereman, 1992; Snyder et al., 1992; Bereman and Lengnick-Hall, 1994; Webster, 1995; 
Barbezat, 2004a; Brown and Woodbury, 1998; Toutkoushian, 1998; Bai et al., 2011; Murawaski 
and King, 2011; Arnold et al., 2012; McDonald and Sorenson, 2017). Bratsberg et al. (2003) 
found strong salary compression among economics faculty after accounting for research, service 
and the fit of faculty to the university. Barbezat (2003) provides an excellent review of various 
factors that may be confounded with seniority, creating the appearance of salary compression or 
inversion where none exists.  
Methods for Detecting Salary Compression 
Salary equity studies became widespread as a result of The Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
and the Equal Pay Act, both in 1972 (Barbezat, 2002). Seniority was often used as a factor in 
these salary models, leading to the detection of salary compression and inversion (Gordon et al., 
1974; Hoffman, 1976; McCulley and Downey, 1993; Barbezat, 2004a). Barbezat (2003) 
provides an excellent review of efforts to detect salary compression through about 2001. There 
have been two primary approaches to identifying salary compression: comparison of ratios of 
salaries at various ranks and multiple regression (Seaman, 2005). A few other techniques for 
identifying salary compression have seen limited use. These include stochastic dominance 
(Arnold et al., 2012; McDonald and Sorenson, 2017), multiple objective programming (Sun, 
2002) and calculation of a coefficient of inversion (Jennings and McLaughlin, 1997). 
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Earlier studies of academic salary compression tended to rely on salary ratios (Gomez-Mejia and 
Balkin, 1987; Barbezat, 2004a). National level data sets often lacked the detail necessary for 
regression analysis, and so were commonly analyzed by determining the ratios of salaries at 
various ranks or relative to some other benchmark (e.g., Pfeffer and Langton, 1988; Bereman and 
Lengnick, 1994; Midha et al., 2004; Seaman, 2005). Comparisons can be made both within and 
between institutions (Dworkin, 1990; Snyder et al., 1992). The problem with ratio data is that 
there is often no reference for how much difference between average salaries is appropriate. If a 
time series of data is available, narrowing of the gaps between average wages at various ranks 
can indicate salary compression (e.g., Hammermesh, 1988; Scott and Bereman, 1992; Seaman, 
2007b; Arnold et al., 2012; June, 2014; McDonald and Sorenson, 2017). Another problem with 
this approach is that it ignores many confounding variables. These problems led to more 
widespread use of regression analysis. 
Regression analysis allows removal of salary variation due to a number of factors (e.g., highest 
degree, previous experience, administrative assignments, unionization, mobility, tenure, 
productivity) in order to better isolate effects of seniority on salary. One of the earliest and best 
studies to identify salary compression used regression on national level data (Ransom, 1993). 
However, many national level data sets lacked detail, and so regression analyses were commonly 
based on data from one or a few institutions (e.g., McCulley and Downey, 1993; Hallock, 1995; 
Brown and Woodbury, 1998; Moore et al., 1998). More detailed national data sets that became 
available in the late 1980s made regression analysis more feasible (e.g., Barbezat and Donihue, 
1998). A significant methodological improvement in the analysis of salary compression was 
presented by Toutkoushian (1998) who developed a five step process for identifying salary 
compression, as well as the extent to which each faculty member’s salary differed from the 
expected salary in the absence of compression. Some regression analyses have found evidence of 
salary compression after controlling for confounding factors (Twigg et al., 2002; Bratsberg et al., 
2003; Yeh and Wang, 2012; Allen et al., 2015), while others have not (Toutkoushian, 1998; 
Barbezat, 2004b; Monks and Robinson, 2001; Seaman, 2007a). Sometimes, compression is 
found for certain disciplines, tenure statuses, or stage of career, but not others (Barbezat and 
Donihue, 1998; Barbezat, 2004a). Only a few studies have considered the effects of gender on 
salary compression (Hoffman, 1976; Brown and Woodbury, 1998; Burke et al., 2005). 
Causes of Salary Compression 
Early examination of salary compression in nonacademic fields blamed the phenomenon on 
inflation, which drove up the salaries necessary to hire new employees. Lack of funds prevented 
comparable salary increases, plus increases for seniority, for ongoing employees (Kassem, 
1971). Although faculty salaries are clearly affected by inflation (Scott and Bereman, 1992), 
salary compression in academia is generally thought to be a result of low supply and high 
demand for faculty in certain disciplines, and the lack of funds to raise senior faculty salaries in a 
commensurate manner (McCulley and Downey, 1993; Burgan, 2005; Burke et al., 2005; 
Seaman, 2007a).  
In contrast, some authors have suggested that salary compression is normal and may not be a 
problem (e.g., Bereman and Lengnick-Hall, 1994). Economists separate human capital (what 
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makes an employee valuable) that is accumulated with experience into general (not specific to an 
employer) and specific (valuable only to the current employer) (Becker, 1975). Faculty skills 
tend to be of the former type, allowing faculty to easily move between universities. If faculty can 
obtain higher salaries by moving to a different university, then it is likely that the best faculty 
will move, while low performers will stay (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 1987). As a result, low 
performers with low pay will have high seniority and higher performers with high pay will have 
low seniority, especially in disciplines with a shortage of faculty (Ransom, 1993; Brown and 
Woodbury, 1998; Monks and Robinson, 2001). 
It is thought that university faculty are in a unique situation with regard to economic factors 
affecting salaries. Tenure and the distance between academic institutions make it especially 
costly for faculty to change employers. Thus, administrations have less need to increase pay with 
seniority in order to retain faculty. This has been termed “monopsony power” (Ransom, 1993; 
Barbezat and Donihue, 1998; Brown and Woodbury, 1998; Siow, 1998). Hallock (1995) argued 
against monopsony effects on faculty salaries. He suggested that his findings may have reflected 
collective bargaining and the urban environment that made it relatively easy to change 
universities. Faculty who stay at relatively low pay may have little incentive to maintain high 
productivity, thus creating justification for the low pay (Moore et al., 1998; Barbezat, 2003). 
However, Ransom (1993) found that productivity did not decrease with seniority.  
Salary compression may be greater at research universities (Ransom, 1993; Brown and 
Woodbury, 1998; Glandon and Glandon, 2001; Allen et al., 2015), although another study found 
more compression in mid-sized universities (Hoffman, 1997). Unionization may decrease 
compression (Barbezat, 1989; Hallock, 1995; Hoffman, 1997), although another study found no 
effect of union representation (Martinello, 2009). It is even possible that higher ranked faculty 
tend to have higher salaries with collective bargaining than without, because collective 
bargaining agreements are almost invariably negotiated by senior faculty. 
Effects of Salary Compression 
Salary compression is not necessarily a problem (Snyder et al., 1992). But in general, there is 
concern about salary compression because of its potential for negative effects on individual, and 
hence institutional, effectiveness. Almost all authors have cited low morale, and consequently 
poor performance, as results of salary compression (Kassem, 1971; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin, 
1987; Blum, 1989; Scott and Bereman, 1992; Snyder et al., 1992; Jennings and McLaughlin, 
1997; Seaman, 2007a). Glassman and Mcafee (2005) argue that such salary inequities are 
unethical, with resulting negative effects on university culture. Alternatively, some have argued 
that flat salary structures promote collegiality, cooperation, and commitment (Lazear, 1981). 
There is an extensive literature regarding these contrasting perspectives in the context of 
corporations (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2014), but they have rarely been examined empirically in 
academia. However, Pfeffer and Langton (1988) found that compressed salaries in academic 
departments were associated with more social and democratic interactions. The same authors in a 
later study (1993) found that salary dispersion was negatively correlated with productivity, 
satisfaction, and collaboration among faculty.  
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When salaries of new hires are higher than those of more senior employees, there is incentive for 
employees to move to a new employer (Amey and VanDerLinden, 2002; Seaman, 2007a). The 
cost of remaining with an employer has been termed a “loyalty tax” (Blum, 1989; Barbezat, 
2004a). Resulting turnover is detrimental due to loss of human capital, hiring costs, and training 
costs for new employees. It is interesting that this hypothesis has received little empirical 
attention. One study concluded that salary compression has decreased faculty retention in 
pharmacy (Murawski and King, 2011). Another found no correlation in business schools 
(Glandon and Glandon, 2001) and a third found that greater pay dispersion among college 
administrators led to higher turnover of lower paid individuals (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 1992). 
Employees who are dissatisfied with salary structures may find an alternative remedy in the 
courts. More senior employees are generally of greater chronological age, providing an 
opportunity to challenge salary inversion on the basis of age discrimination. These have not been 
successful (Mooney, 1991; O’Boyle, 2001; Euben, 2003). 
Responding to Salary Compression 
Once a university has determined that salary compression exists, it must decide what to do about 
it. Some argue that salary compression is not a problem and may simply reflect the value of 
faculty at various levels of seniority with regard to productivity (Moore et al., 1998; Barbezat, 
2004a) or market forces (Euben, 2003), or that flat salary structures promote cooperation and 
productivity (Bowen and Shuster, 1986; Pfeffer and Langton, 1988, 1993; Lazear, 1981). Still, 
there is widespread agreement that salaries should rise with seniority (Becker, 1975; Topel, 
1991), so it is common for institutions to attempt to restore this correlation. The problem has 
been recognized in academia for decades, and it does not seem to be going away (Boggs, 2015; 
Flaherty, 2016; McDonald and Sorenson, 2017; Rees, 2017). As stated in the seminal work by 
Gomez-Mejia and Balkin (1987) “Identifying pay compression, its causes, and its effects is a far 
simpler task than devising ways in which universities, or other employers, can deal with the 
problems that such a condition creates.” Consequently, the literature on the latter is far less 
extensive than the former. 
A number of strategies have been suggested to prevent salary compression from occurring. 
Lillydahl and Singell (1992) note that, while salaries are often positively correlated with research 
productivity, teaching quality is not similarly rewarded. They suggest that if it were, late-career 
faculty who concentrate more on teaching than research might not have compressed salaries. 
Although we have not found this suggestion in the literature, it is possible that greater value 
might be placed on service. It is possible that senior faculty are more valuable, not because they 
produce more scholarship, but for the same reason that administrators are more valuable; they 
have knowledge and experience that allows them to wisely contribute to shared governance of 
the university. If this were recognized in performance evaluations, then merit raises might 
alleviate salary compression. It may be possible to balance lower salaries of senior faculty with 
non-monetary compensation. These might include first pick of paid tasks such as consulting or 
additional teaching assignments, better offices, and more convenient schedules (Gomez-Mejia 
and Balkin, 1987; Glassman and Mcafee, 2005). Snyder et al. (1992) surveyed provosts who 
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suggested increasing raises associated with promotions, setting salary minimums, and promoting 
more rapidly. 
Universities also commonly attempt to correct for salary compression by identifying individual 
faculty with unjustifiably low salaries, followed by calculation of the salary increase required to 
rectify the problem. There are difficulties with this post-hoc approach. One must find the 
necessary money, and lack of funds was probably the primary cause of the problem in the first 
place. Further, it is a temporary solution that must be repeated frequently if future salary 
compression is to be prevented.  
Most often, factors such as merit rank, time in rank, longevity at the institution and market 
conditions for each discipline are used to build a multiple regression model to predict salaries, 
and negative residuals are indicators of the degree to which individual salaries should be raised 
(Huseman et al., 1996). At Indiana State University, residuals from a multiple regression analysis 
were used to flag low paid faculty, who then argued their case for raises to departmental 
personnel committees (Lamb and Moates, 1999). Duncan et al. (2004) avoided penalizing high-
performing faculty for having high salaries by removing the effects of earlier merit raises before 
addressing equity. Similarly, Herzog (2008) developed a four-step process to address 
discrimination prior to equity and merit. Jennings and McLaughlin (1997) found that, out of five 
models for calculating salary compression corrections, none decreased compression best for all 
departments, or for various funding levels within departments.  
Methods other than regression are also used to calculate salary adjustments that correct 
compression. Rather than regression analysis, Stewart et al. (1996) used standard salary 
predictors to build a salary goal table for each rank and discipline. Richardson and Thomas 
(2013) recommended using an “equity-performance matrix” to merge compression and 
performance influences on salary adjustments. The University of Wisconsin Oshkosh combined 
productivity increases for full professors with internal equity adjustments based on regression 
and larger promotion salary raises (Flaherty, 2013). Although they note that differential salary 
increases are viewed with skepticism by most faculty union members, Blitz and Cross (2013) 
recommended balancing equity and market forces through the collective bargaining process. 
They reviewed collective bargaining agreements and describe how Eastern Illinois University 
avoided salary compression by changing promotion raises from a consistent dollar amount (a 
smaller percentage of higher salaries) to a consistent percent of base salary.  
 
Case Study 
It is widely accepted that salary compression in higher education results from competition for 
high demand/low supply faculty in certain disciplines. In order for a university to hire such 
individuals, they are offered high salaries, often higher than their more senior colleagues. This is 
compounded when cost of living and promotion raises are minimized in order to budget for high 
salaries of new hires (McCulley and Downey, 1993; Burgan, 2005; Burke et al., 2005; Seaman, 
2007a). The causes of salary compression at Northern Michigan University (NMU) were quite 
different and previously undescribed in the literature on this topic. Further, the solution, which is 
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also unique, has been gradually devised across five contracts, and has resulted in both correction 
and prevention of salary compression. 
Demographics 
Northern Michigan University (NMU) is an upper-Midwest four-year comprehensive university 
with an enrollment of roughly 7,000 students. Its faculty are represented by two unions: the 
NMU Chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), and the Northern 
Michigan University Faculty Association (NMUFA). The former is the largest, with both part-
time and full-time faculty numbering close to 400, while the latter represents around 20 full-time 
only faculty. Thus, the AAUP faculty were chosen for this analysis, as its membership comprises 
nearly 90% of teaching faculty representing most of the 160 programs.  
Overview of the Problem 
Serious discussion of salary compression at NMU was initiated during contract negotiations 
between NMU Administration and AAUP in 2003. Although, some authors have suggested 
establishment of salary minimums and salary increases for promotion as a remedy for salary 
compression (Snyder et al., 1992), these were the primary cause of compression at NMU. 
Negotiation notes from 2003 indicate that it was already clear that salary increases associated 
with promotion were only about one-quarter of the dollar gap between minimum salaries for all 
ranks. Consequently, even when faculty were hired well above the minimum for a rank, they 
almost always were increased to the minimum salary at the next rank. Additionally, for almost 
two decades, promotion amounts and salary minimums tended to increase each year at a percent 
value equal to the across-the-board (ATB) cost-of-living salary adjustment. Thus, even after 
promotion, salary minimums for each rank increased at the same rate as salaries of faculty 
already in that rank, resulting in most faculty salaries falling within a narrow range near the rank 
minimum. The following is a summary of discussions and solutions resulting from 
labor/management contract negotiations that occurred at three-year intervals from 2003 through 
2015.  
The Beginning - 2003 
In the 2003 contract negotiation, AAUP proposed to address this problem by setting minimums 
for full professors that increased with seniority. In contrast, Administration proposed that rank 
minimums should be held relatively constant, while ATB moved more senior faculty above the 
minimums. Either approach would alleviate compression, but the former would be more costly 
than the latter. No resolution or action was agreed upon, but language was inserted into the 
contract that required formation of a joint faculty/administration committee to study market 
factors, salary compression, and faculty compensation in the subsequent academic year, with the 
stipulation that the committee’s recommendations would be given serious consideration in the 
next contract negotiation. 
The salary compression committee’s final report was submitted May 24, 2005. They affirmed 
salary compression for associate and full professors based on a subjective identification of the 
narrow range of most salaries for each rank that were clustered around the minimum, regardless 
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of seniority. Four systemic causes of compression were identified. First, while merit, equity, and 
enrollment incentives in addition to ATB salary increases had created some variation in salaries, 
these had not occurred for over a decade. Salary dispersion was then lost as faculty who had 
received such increases in the 1980s and 1990s retired. Second, contracts in the 1970s had 
specified salaries based on years in rank, as well as rank, but these were abandoned in favor of 
minimum salaries for ranks alone. From 1985 on, minimum salaries increased at the same 
percentages as ATB.  Third, the impact of large differences between minimum salaries for 
faculty ranks (as explained in the previous paragraph) usually brought faculty to the same 
minimum level after promotion. Fourth, although market factors influenced initial salaries, 
promotion tended to erase these and there was no recurring market review that would maintain 
such differences. The committee recommended adjustments to salaries based on merit, seniority, 
and market to remedy compression. However, they noted that this would require acceptance 
from the bargaining unit of unequal raises, and that these would all be short-term solutions. They 
provided a number of long-term solutions that all revolved around differential increases to rank 
minimums, ATBs, and promotion amounts. 
CUPA & Inversions - 2006 
During negotiation of the 2006 contract, Administration proposed several interconnected 
strategies to address salary compression that were ultimately accepted. First, in addition to ATB 
increases, a market and seniority adjustment totaling 3.1% of total faculty salaries was 
distributed. Faculty received the highest of a) the College and University Professional 
Association for Human Resources (CUPA-HR, or simply CUPA) disciplinary average, b) rank 
minimum plus 0.6% for each year in rank (up to 6 years for assistant and associate professors 
and, 20 years for full professors), or c) the individual’s previous year salary times 1.015. Second, 
ATBs went up faster than rank minimums. A third strategy to combat salary compression was a 
large increase in promotion raises (almost five times the previous amount on average) that varied 
with an individual’s pre-promotion salary (a flat amount plus 3% of the previous salary). This 
allowed faculty with relatively high salaries to maintain that position after promotion, rather than 
simply going to the minimum for the next rank. Finally, it was recognized that these changes 
would create salary inversions. Therefore, it was agreed that a Faculty Salary Inversion Review 
Committee would be formed to consider these and recommend adjustments to the Provost and 
Vice President for Academic Affairs.  
No guidelines for the committee were provided. The committee recommended that salary of 
faculty whose salaries were inverted by promotion of a colleague at the same rank and CUPA 
classification should be brought up to that of the promoted colleague, plus $100 for each year in 
rank. This resulted in salary adjustments for 12 faculty in 5 departments at a total cost of $20,864 
to base salaries. This contract was the first in many years in which minimum salaries for each 
rank increased by a smaller percentage than the ATB. 
Inversions are Corrected - 2009 
In the 2009 contract, the salary inversion committee and its procedures were defined in a 
memorandum of understanding attached to the contract. Salary inversions were determined to 
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occur when a newly promoted faculty member’s salary is greater than someone in the same 
CUPA Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) code who was previously at that rank and 
the newly promoted faculty member does not have a justifiably high salary based on market or 
achievement. Such unusually high value hires who were exempt from triggering salary 
inversions were to be identified at the time of hire. Faculty whose salaries were inverted based 
on this definition would have their salary adjusted in an amount equal to the difference in salaries 
plus $100 for each year in rank up to five years. Minimum salaries at each rank again increased 
at a smaller percentage than ATB. 
Getting to Market - 2012 
Two steps were taken in the 2012 contract to alleviate salary compression. First, procedures for 
the salary inversion committee were moved from the addendum to the 2009 contract into the 
main body of the 2012 contract, providing the perception of a more permanent component of the 
salary determination process. Such committees meet in the fall of each academic year to 
mutually agree to adjust inverted faculty salaries, however, the committee is under no obligation 
to do so.   
Second, market and seniority issues were addressed with the dedication of 0.5% and 1.0%, 
respectively, of total faculty salary dedicated to the effort. Target salaries for each faculty 
member were calculated as market salary for CIP code and rank based on CUPA data at public 
institutions, plus a proportion of salary for fringe benefits, plus 1% of salary for each year in rank 
capped at 20 years for full professors and 5 years for all other ranks. Target salaries were 
multiplied by 1.25 for 12-month faculty and by 0.8 for those without a terminal degree. Salary 
adjustments based on these calculations were capped at $4000. Prior to these adjustments, 
salaries of 81 of 300 full-time faculty were under their target, while only five were under target 
after adjustment. Minimum salaries at each rank again increased at a smaller percentage than 
ATB. 
Initial Hire Salary - 2015 
 
The final component of our process was negotiated in the 2015 contract. While annual and 
promotion increases were almost entirely dependent on contract specifications that were applied 
to all faculty equally, initial salaries were negotiated individually at the time of hire. These then 
have a huge effect on base salary and raises (usually a percent of base salary) throughout one’s 
career. This difference is compounded because the salary differences between faculty who start 
with salaries higher and their peers gradually grow throughout a career. This problem is 
exacerbated because it is often suggested that negotiation of initial salaries can be biased as a 
function of gender (Porter et al., 2008; Freund et al., 2016). Specification of a formula for 
calculation of initial salary removes the potential for such bias and creates a justification for 
salary differentials throughout the faculty, in all disciplines and career stages. Initial salaries are 
determined by the following: 
1) contractually mandated salary minimums if these are higher than any of the following. 
10
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2) if there is another faculty member with the same CIP code and rank currently in the 
hiring department, initial salary will be the current faculty member’s salary minus 1% for 
each year in rank. 
3) average CUPA salary for the CIP code and rank. 
4) if there is no discipline and rank specific CUPA data, the most recent CUPA average 
for “All Disciplines and All Institutions Combined” times the CUPA market factor for 
the next highest rank. 
 
Conclusion 
Our approach to correcting salary compression and preventing its recurrence has spanned 5 
contracts and 17 years. Initial salaries are now set in a transparent, objective, and justifiable 
fashion that reflects market forces. Nine years of increases in minimum salaries that were less 
than ATB or inflation has created a situation in which few faculty are hired at minimum salaries 
or promoted to minimum salaries. Furthermore, salary dispersion is maintained subsequent to 
promotion. When anomalies arise (i.e., salary inversions), they are identified and corrected in a 
consistent manner. Across the 11 years in which our salary inversion committee has been active, 
the average number of faculty who have had salary adjustments due to inversion has been 7.6 per 
year and the dollar amount added to base salaries has averaged $15,007 per year. Problems with 
effective function of the salary inversion committee at this point in the evolution of our contract 
are that 1) inversions are triggered only by promotion, so that they can exist for several years, or 
indefinitely at the rank of professor, without being detected, and 2) inversions exist only within 
the same CIP code, the assignment of which falls under management rights; hence, faculty are 
sometimes dissatisfied with their CIP code. A negative effect of this approach has been that our 
salary structure is quite rigid. When college deans negotiate hiring conditions, there is no room 
for salary negotiation; initial salaries are simply defined by the contract. This can repel some 
candidates who expect to dicker and win. Similarly, if excellent faculty are courted by other 
universities, matching external offers could trigger salary inversions. This quandary could result 
in loss of our some of best faculty. However, neither of these potential problems has seemed to 
become significant. Overall, the cause of our salary compression problems and their solutions 
have been unique. 
Although most agree that salaries should be positively correlated with seniority, there is not 
agreement on the degree of salary dispersion that best promotes university effectiveness.  
Dispersion of faculty salaries in higher education is influenced by factors such as type of 
university, discipline, rank, collective bargaining, and year, so regression analysis is generally 
accepted as the best method for detecting compression. Additionally, regression can indicate the 
degree of correction appropriate for individual faculty. But there is not agreement on what 
predictor variables make the best models, and this is likely to differ between universities and 
even departments. Correction of salary compression takes money, but the real challenge is 
changing the factors that cause compression so that the process does not need to be repeated 
frequently. Our approach to changing the systemic causes of compression was gradual (over a 15 
year period and 5 contracts) and strongly reliant on the shared governance process throughout. It 
used market adjustments, consistent correction of salary inversions, and defined initial salaries to 
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create a transparent and justifiable salary structure that precludes the worst forms of 
compression. 
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